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FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER ALIEN TORT CLAIMs-Sanchez-Es-
pinoza v. Reagan-On August 13, 1985, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit failed to take
advantage of an opportunity to promote a recent movement in
the American justice system toward allowing United States fed-
eral courts to hear cases involving fundamental human rights in
their international dimension. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan' is a
case in which alien plaintiffs asserted that violations of human
dignity, including torture, had been committed by the United
States Government. The international context of the allegations
mandated that the courts exercise prudence in their resolution
of the dispute. There are various factors which must be consid-
ered by courts when adjudicating disputes of international di-
mension. As only one branch of a tri-parte governmental frame-
work, the federal courts must exercise care to ensure that United
States policy abroad is consistent with the goals of the executive
and legislative branches as well as with the goals of international
justice.2 Thus, courts are presented with many problems when
confronted with cases involving international law, especially
when it has been averred that United States foreign policy has
resulted in torture abroad.
These problems were exemplified in the Sanchez-Espinoza
case. The United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia dismissed the action against the President of the United
States and other federal officials as a non-justiciable political
question.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed and added other
grounds for dismissal.4
1. 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
2. Cf. Lobel, The Limits of Constitution Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy
and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071 (1985). Lobel argues that the judiciary has
an obligation to review foreign policy actions because treaties and customary interna-
tional law are part of the supreme law of the land. Thus, the courts should have an
active role in preventing the other branches of government from violating treaties and
international norms. Id. See also infra note 103 and accompanying text.
3. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 596-602.
4. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 202-11.
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I. FACTUAL BAKGROUND
The claims presented in Sanchez-Espinoza arose out of the
United States Government's alleged support of "Contra" forces
which actively bear arms against the government of Nicaragua
in an attempt to overthrow the ruling regime. The complaint
asserted that these Contra forces "have carried out 'scores of at-
tacks upon innocent Nicaraguan civilians' which have 'resulted
in summary execution, murder, abduction, torture, rape, wound-
ing, and the destruction of private property and public facili-
ties.'" It may be noted that the Nicaraguan government re-
sponded by taking and torturing thousands of political
prisoners.
The specific allegations are netted in a complex web of
plaintiffs and defendants. For clarity, the district court catego-
rized the plaintiffs and defendants into groups.8
The plaintiffs in Sanchez-Espinoza were divided into three
groups.9 The first group consisted of twelve Nicaraguan citizens
seeking redress for tortious injuries committed by the Contras in
5. Id. at 204.
6. Id. at 205 (quoting Amended Complaint para. 81).
7. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Report to the Joint Committee on
Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 489 (Feb. 2, 1981). In 1980-
81, reliable reports asserted that torture had been used by the police at the Palo Alto
State Security Investigation Center and at the Department of State Security. Prisoners
had been forced to sign statements claiming that they had not been abused, and were
threatened with severe retaliation if they later asserted that they had been abused. In
1981, the Nicaraguan government (dominated by the Sandinista National Liberation
Front) was reportedly responsible for cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment of about 5,000 political prisoners, 96 cases of disappearances, arbitrary arrests and
imprisonment, denial of fair public trial, invasion of the home abuses, and several other
human rights violations, including suppression of civil and political liberties. Id. at 489-
97.
8. Sanchez-Espinoza, 508 F. Supp. at 598. The specific allegations are more easily
understood when the many plaintiffs and defendants are divided into groups, then the
particular assertions presented by each group can be identified and analyzed in a clear
and organized fashion. This is what the district court did. The court of appeals followed
suit and maintained the district court's grouping of plaintiffs and defendants. Sanchez-
Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 205. The relief sought may be listed as "compensatory and puni-
tive damages, declaratory relief, mandamus, injunction, attorneys' fees, and any other
just and proper relief," 770 F.2d at 206, but the deeper goal of the plaintiffs, it may be
argued, was politically motivated. They wished to alter United States foreign policy in
Nicaragua.
9. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 205.
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Nicaragua against these plaintiffs and their families.10 The sec-
ond group consisted of twelve members of the United States
Congress seeking injunctive and declaratory relief due to the
failure of the defendants to conform with the constitutional pro-
vision maintaining Congress' right to declare war and defend-
ants' disregard for congressional statutes prohibiting support of
the Contras by the United States." Finally, two residents of
Dade County, Florida joined in the action to enjoin the mainte-
nance and operation of paramilitary training camps at that loca-
tion which constituted an alleged nuisance."
The defendants, likewise, were classified into three distinct
groups. Nine present or former executive officials of the United
States were sued individually and in their official capacities.' 3
Two organizations-Alpha 66, Inc., and Bay of Pigs Veterans
Association, Brigade 2506, Inc.-were alleged operators of
paramilitary training camps in the United States and repre-
sented the second group of defendants. 4 Max Vargas, a Nicara-
guan exile, and several unidentified officers and agents of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Union-Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Nicaragua, which operates military camps in Nicaragua and else-
where, comprised the third group.'6
Plaintiffs asserted eight claims for relief.'6 The Nicaraguan
plaintiffs (the first group) claimed 1) compensatory and 2) puni-
tive damages for injuries sustained in United States sponsored




13. Id. Those officials were President Reagan; then C.I.A. director, William Casey;
former Secretary of State, Alexander Haig; Secretary of State, George Schultz; Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders; United States Ambassa-
dor at Large, Vernon Walters; Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger; Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs, Nestor Sanchez; and United States
Ambassador to Honduras, John Negroponte. Enders was sued individually only, and the
complaint does not specify in what capacity Haig was sued. Id. at 205 n.1.
14. Id. at 205.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 205-06. On appeal, the claims against the federal appellees alleging failure
to enforce the Neutrality Act and other statutes regarding paramilitary training camps in
violation of their duty under article II, section 3 of the United States Constitution, were
not presented for review and were deemed to have been abandoned. Id. at 206 n.3.
17. Specific accounts of attacks on Nicaraguan towns by the Contras were recounted
in the complaint which asserted that "raids are continuing on a regular basis." Id. at
19871
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had been carried out and financed by the United States and its
agents and employees in an effort to overthrow the government
of Nicaragua."8 They maintained 3) that the raids violated fun-
damental human rights established under international law and
under the United States Constitution. 9 Finally, the Nicaraguan
plaintiffs called for 4) injunctive relief prohibiting United States
military involvement in Nicaragua in the future.2 °
The Congressional plaintiffs (the second group) alleged that
United States' activities in Nicaragua were acts of war which
were not authorized by Congress. Therefore, 5) Congress' au-
thority under article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution to
declare war had been violated.2 Similar arguments were made
citing the Neutrality Laws22 and the War Powers Resolution,2 3
205-06 (quoting Amended Complaint para. 117).




22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 956, 960 (1982). It is a crime to conspire to injure property of a
foreign government. Section 956 provides:
If two or more persons within the jurisdiction of the United States conspire
to injure or destroy specific property situated within a foreign country and be-
longing to a foreign government or to any political subdivision thereof with
which the United States is at peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge, or other pub-
lic utility so situated, and if one or more such persons commits an act within the
jurisdiction of the United States to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of
the parties to the conspiracy shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both.
Section 960 makes expeditions against friendly nations a crime:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or pro-
vides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any
military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against
the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district,
or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than
$3,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
23. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (Supp. 1987). The relevant portions of the War Powers Res-
olution are as follows:
§ 1541 Purpose and policy
(a) Congressional declaration
It is the purpose of this chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers of the
Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of
both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the contin-
ued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
(c) Presidential executive power as Commander-in-Chief; limitation
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and declaratory relief was sought. The congressional plaintiffs
also claimed that 6) defendants had violated the Boland Amend-
ment to the 1983 Department of Defense Appropriations Act
which prohibits the Central Intelligence Agency and the Depart-
ment of Defense from using funds under the Act for activities
meant to result in the overthrow of the Nicaraguan govern-
ment,24 and 7) the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which requires re-
ports to Congress about United States intelligence activities. 25
The final claim was promoted on behalf of the third group
of plaintiffs, residents of Florida. They petitioned for 8) injunc-
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to intro-
duce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where immi-
nent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are ex-
ercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
§ 1542. Consultation; initial and regular consultations
The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before
introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until
United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been
removed from such situations.
Section 1543 requires the President to submit a written report to Congress within 48
hours of any hostile military operations and outlines the necessary contents of such a
report.
§ 1544. Congressional action
(c) Concurrent resolution for removal by President of United States
Armed Forces
[Alt any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities
outside the territory of the United States. . . such forces shall be removed by
the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.
24. Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793 (96 Stat.) 1830, 1865 (1982):
None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, mili-
tary training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or
individual, not part of a country's armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing
the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicara-
gua and Honduras.
25. 50 U.S.C. § 413 (Supp. 1987). This law provides that the heads of all depart-
ments, agencies and other entities of the United States involved in intelligence activities
must keep the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities in
which the United States is involved. Id. For more on the purpose and legislative history
of this act, see 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4182; Note, United States Foreign
Policy Through Cloak and Dagger War Operations: Terrorism or Mandate of National
Security?, 11 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 159 (1986).
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tive relief claiming that paramilitary training camps in Florida
constituted a nuisance under Florida law.26
Jurisdiction for the case was asserted pursuant to federal
question jurisdiction,27 the Alien Tort Statute28 and the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction.29
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The District Court Decision
The complaint of the three groups of plaintiffs was origi-
nally filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia on November 30, 1982.0 Plaintiffs failed, however, to
serve process on several of the defendants in a timely manner
and the action as to them was dismissed on June 8, 1983, pursu-
ant to Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."1 On
July 20, 1983, an amended complaint was filed and was consid-
ered by the district court. 2
Judge Corcoran, writing for the district court, declared that
all allegations by the Nicaraguan and congressional plaintiffs
represented non-justiciable political questions.33 In determining
whether resolution of the dispute violated separation-of-powers
principles, thus making it a non-justiciable political question,
the court relied on the following findings: 1) the United States
Constitution committed the power to make foreign policy deci-
sions to the coordinate political branches; 2) judicially managea-
ble standards for resolving the case and adequate discovery were
precluded by the international nature of the dispute; 3) policy
decisions requiring non-judicial discretion were a necessary pre-
requisite to deciding the case; 4) resolution would express a lack
26. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 598.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1982).
28. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1948)). The Alien Tort Statute provides jurisdiction in United States federal courts for
aliens alleging torts in foreign countries.
29. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 716 (1966) (Justice Brennan,
writing for the court, held that pendent jurisdiction "exists whenever there is a substan-
tial federal claim and the relationship between it and the asserted state claims permits
the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises one 'case' ").
30. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 598 n.1.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 597-602.
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of respect for the coordinate political branches; 5) there existed
a need for adherence to political decisions which had already
been made by the coordinate political branches; and 6) resolu-
tion of the case risked contradiction between the various depart-
ments of government on a particular question. 4 These findings
were applied to the allegations by the nonresident aliens claim-
ing that atrocities were committed against them by the Contras
under United States sponsorship and to the claims by the con-
gressional plaintiffs relating to the neutrality laws, War Powers
Resolution, and the Hughes-Ryan and Boland Amendments to
the National Security Act."
Additionally, the district court noted that the congressional
claims could have been dismissed on a theory of equitable or
remedial discretion. 6 Riegle v. Federal Open Market Commit-
tee37 provides:
The most satisfactory means of translating our separa-
tion-of-powers concerns into principled decisionmaking
[sic] is through a doctrine of circumscribed equitable dis-
cretion. Where a congressional plaintiff could obtain sub-
stantial relief from his fellow legislators through the en-
actment, repeal, or amendment of a statute, this court
should exercise its equitable discretion to dismiss the leg-
islators action.
8
The court in Riegle believed, as did the court in Sanchez-Espi-
noza, that plaintiffs were attempting to circumvent the process
of democratic decison making.39
The claims of the Florida residents had no basis for jurisdic-
tion except under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, ° which
provides federal jurisdiction over state claims in conjunction
with substantial federal causes of action.4 1 Thus, the nuisance
34. Id. at 599-602. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 600-01 n.5.
37. 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
38. Id. at 881. See also Vander Jagt v. O'Neil, 699 F.2d 1166, 1174 n.23 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 902 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355
(1983).
39. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 600-01 n.5.
40. Id. at 602.
41. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in United Mine Workers supports the pro-
1987]
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claim under Florida state law could only be heard in the federal
district court by virtue of the federal claims which accompanied
it. Because all federal claims for relief had been dismissed under
the political question doctrine, there was no jurisdictional
"hook" to support plaintiffs' state action."3 The plaintiffs ap-
pealed the decision of the district court.
B. Issues on Appeal
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision. Judge Scalia, writing for
the court of appeals, approved of the lower court's analysis with
regard to the political question doctrine and presented addi-
tional grounds upon which the claims of the plaintiffs could be
dismissed. The additional grounds included findings that the
Alien Tort Statute did not provide the court with jurisdiction or
the plaintiffs standing to sue.4 Furthermore, the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity protected the defendants from the plaintiffs'
action." The circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional
claims, and claims under the War Powers Act and the Hughes-
Ryan Amendment to the National Security Act were dismissed
as having no available remedies.' The assertions under the Neu-
trality Act were dismissed because the circuit court refused to
allow a private right of action pursuant to a criminal statute.46
The claim relating to the Boland Amendment was declared moot
because the amendment was no longer in force at the time of the
circuit court's decision.'7 Finally, the allegations under the state
laws of Florida were dismissed for lack of independent jurisdic-
tion.48 Each of these issues will be discussed in turn.
Judge Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion to clarify his po-
sition with respect to dismissal of the congressional plaintiffs'
claims under the War Powers Clause. Judge Ginsburg cited Jus-
position that state claims may be heard in federal courts only when federal causes are
conjunctionally averred. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
42. Sanchez -Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 602.
43. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 206-07.
44.. Id. at 207-08.
45. Id. at 208-09.
46. Id. at 209-10.




tice Powell's concurring statements in Goldwater v. Carter9 as
dispositive in Sanchez-Espinoza.s° He stated that the congres-
sional claim for relief is not "ripe for judicial review" since it is
not the court's place to decide issues "'affecting the allocation of
power between the President and Congress.'-5
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
A. Political Question
The political question doctrine is an aspect of justiciability
which is not often invoked. It is derived from the principles of
separation of powers and prudential concerns. Courts will not
decide matters which are committed to the executive or legisla-
tive branches of government, nor will they issue a decision based
on a particular factual setting when such an issuance would be
unwise due to a lack of discoverable standards or the necessity
of maintaining respect for previous policy decisions.52 The mod-
ern approach to deciding whether a case presents a non-justicia-
ble political question is outlined in the Supreme Courts'
landmark decision in Baker v. Carr.5 8
In Baker, the Court announced a series of six factors, at
least one of which must be present in order to render an issue
non-justiciable:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable con-
stitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate polit-
ical department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibil-
ity of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossi-
bility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of respect due coordinate
49. 444 U.S. 996, 997-1002 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell wrote that
"[t]he judicial branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between
the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse."
Id. at 997.
50. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
51. Id. (quoting Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997).
52. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
53. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that the constitutionality of legislative apportion-
ment schemes is not a political question).
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branches of government; or an unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question."'
These factors were all considered in the court's dismissal of the
Sanchez-Espinoza plaintiffs' complaint.5
The circuit court also relied on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Haig v. Agee, 56 which stated that "[m]atters intimately
related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper
subjects for judicial intervention" because they are " 'so exclu-
sively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune to judicial inquiry or interference.'""
Not all questions involving United States foreign policy are
shielded from judicial review. There are many examples of cases
in which foreign policy issues did not preclude a ruling by the
Court. For instance, in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Saw-
yers,58 it was held that President Truman could not seize the
nation's steel mills during a strike despite the exigent circum-
stances which arose out of the Korean conflict.5 9 Similarly, in
Dames and Moore v. Regan,60 the Supreme Court held that
President Carter had authority to suspend damage claims
against Iran as part of a bargain to secure the release of United
States citizens who were being held hostage.
The Sanchez-Espinoza court noted that when political deci-
sions have already been made on a particular policy issue, defer-
ence must be appropriately given "to the decisions of the politi-
cal branches, who are constitutionally empowered to conduct
foreign relations and provide for national security."
'6'
The court began its analysis with the claims of the congres-
54. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 599 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). See also
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (relying significantly on the "commitment to other
branches" strand); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939) (focusing on the "lack of
judicially manageable standards" strand).
55. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 203-06.
56. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
57. Id. at 292 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)).
58. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
59. Id. at 586. Despite the United States' need for steel for the war effort, the Court
ruled that Truman's seizure of the mills was illegal.
60. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
61. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 599.
[Vol. V
COMMENTS
sional plaintiffs. Those plaintiffs contended that because Con-
gress had already done all it could, i.e., pass legislation, the judi-
ciary was obligated to control the executive branch's abuse of
power.6 2 The court, however, refused to exercise such control.68
The district court found that the case presented a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolution
of the case6' and found support in the case of Crockett v. Rea-
gan.65 Crockett involved a challenge to the legality of United
States presence in, and military assistance to, El Salvador.6
Like Sanchez-Espinoza, Crockett required judicial inquiry into
"sensitive military matters. ' '67 These matters were held to be un-
discoverable and unmanageable, and the case was, therefore, dis-
missed as a non-justiciable political question." The Sanchez-Es-
pinoza court pointed out that military involvement in Nicaragua
included the covert activities of C.I.A. operatives, thus rendering
the facts of Sanchez-Espinoza less discoverable than those re-
lating to the participation in El Salvadoran hostilities.69
A second strand of the Baker factors was found to be pre-
sent in Sanchez-Espinoza when the district court determined
that it was unable to make an independent resolution of the is-
sue without expressing a lack of respect toward the coordinate
branches of government. 0 President Reagan had, on numerous
occasions, stated to the public and to Congress that he was not
violating the Boland Amendment or any other legislation via his
policies in Nicaragua.71 The court feared that if it were to hold
that President Reagan was mistaken or was shielding the truth,
62. Id. at 600.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
66. Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356.
67. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 600.
68. Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356.
69. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 600. See also Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977
(D.C. Cir. 1982). In Halkin, plaintiffs asserted that they had been illegally subjected to
surveillance and interception of their foreign communications during the Vietnam war
era. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the Central Intelligence Agency was pro-
tected by the state secrets privilege and that a judicial determination against intelli-
gence-gathering operations would have been an abuse of discretion. Thus, C.I.A. covert
activities are largely undiscoverable. 690 F.2d at 983-1009.
70. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 600.
71. Id.
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based on the court's use of a "necessarily incomplete evidentiary
record," one or both of the coordinate political branches would
have cause to be offended.s
The court also found grounds for dismissal of the case as a
political question in the danger of embarrassment from "multi-
farious pronouncements by various departments. 7' The Presi-
dent had asserted that his acts were within the bounds of legis-
lation and were necessary for the security of the United States.7
Congress was at that time debating the validity of the Presi-
dent's position.75 The district court opined that judicial resolu-
tion of the issues presented would yield a third position which
would upset the "diplomatic balance that is required in the for-
eign affairs arena."76
The claims of the Nicaraguan plaintiffs were dismissed as
non-justiciable political questions on the same grounds as those
of the congressional plaintiffs. 77 "In order to adjudicate the tort
claims of the Nicaraguan plaintiffs, we would have to determine
the precise nature and extent of the U.S. Government's involve-
ment in the affairs of several Central American nations, namely,
Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. "78 The dis-
trict court upon dismissing the claims of the Nicaraguan plain-
tiffs asserted that it had neither the resources nor the expertise
necessary to oversee United States military affairs in Central
America. 9
72. Id.
73. Id. See supra text accompanying note 54.
74. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 600.
75. Id.
76. Id. See also Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1974) (question as to the legality of bombing and other military activities
in Cambodia after removal of American forces from Vietnam was deemed a non-justicia-
ble political question).
77. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 601.
78. Id. See also Amended Complaint para. 40, 42, 46, 48-53, 73 & 76 (nondiscoverable
allegations); Eminente v. Johnson, 361 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 929
(1966) (action by nonresident alien for damages to property in a foreign country alleg-
edly caused by United States armed forces could not be maintained against United
States without its consent).
79. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 602.
[Vol. V
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B. Alien Tort Statute
In 1789, the newly created federal district courts were
granted jurisdiction over various international matters. The
First Judiciary Act provided that "[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States." 80 This Alien Tort Statute was long obscured
by a lack of legislative history and judicial interpretation."
However, the purposes of the act may be reasonably inferred
through analysis of historical documents and the cases since
1980 which have based claims of jurisdiction on the Alien Tort
Statute.
The language of the Alien Tort Statute clearly allows non-
resident plaintiffs to commence civil actions in the United States
district courts. The act does not require that defendants be citi-
zens of the United States. Thus, the uncertainty before the
Sanchez-Espinoza court stemmed from the necessity of deter-
mining whether Congress intended that the statute confer juris-
diction over nonresident defendants. Furthermore, the court had
to make a ruling as to whether the statute allows aliens to bring
suit against public defendants acting in their official capacities.
The available historical documents appear to indicate that
Congress was principally concerned with violations of interna-
tional law by American citizens acting privately.8 2 For example,
events leading up to the enactment of the statute included con-
gressional admonitions against the violation of the rights of neu-
trals on February 26 and May 9 of 1778,83 messages to Congress
by the French Minister Gerard concerning the taking of neutral
Spanish vessels on April 24 and May 19 of 1779,84 and the well
publicized scandal of June, 1779 involving prominent Americans
80. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
81. The Alien Tort Statute had provided jurisdiction in only two cases prior to 1980:
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (child custody suit between aliens);
Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 Fed. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (statute used as alternate basis for juris-
diction in suit to determine title to slaves on board an enemy vessel taken on the high
seas).
82. Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933, 1015 (1982).
83. 10 Journals of the Continental Congress 196 (1778) (W. Ford ed. 1908); 11 Jour-
nals of the Continental Congress 486 (1778) (W. Ford ed. 1908).
84. 3 Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution 134-36, 170-171 (F.
Wharton ed. 1889).
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in the taking of a neutral Portuguese vessel.8 5 Congress re-
sponded with a resolution dated November 23, 1781,88 which was
probably "the progenitor of the Alien Tort Statute. 87 It urged
the state legislatures to enact criminal sanctions for violations of
international law and provided "that it be farther recommended
to authorize suits to be instituted for damages by the parties
injured, and for compensation to the United States for damage
sustained by them for an injury done to a foreign power by a
citizen. "88
This sketchy historical outline is not dispositive of the issue.
Recent cases have indicated a broader interpretation of the
Alien Tort Statute which allows alien plaintiffs to bring suit
against foreign defendants in the United States federal courts.8 9
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 90 the Second Circuit allowed a suit to
be brought pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute in which
Paraguayan citizens claimed that their son had been tortured to
death by the Paraguayan Chief of Police (defendant). The court
held that official torture constitutes a violation of fundamental
human rights and is therefore proscribed by customary interna-
tional law.9 1 Thus, held the court, the law of nations had been
violated and the jurisdictional grant of the Alien Tort Statute
had been triggered.2
The broad interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute by the
Filartiga court was put in doubt four years later when the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided the case
of Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic. 8 A suit brought under the
Alien Tort law for alleged acts of terrorism in Israel was dis-
missed unanimously by a panel of judges which was sharply di-
85. 14 Journals of the Continental Congress 538-42 (1779) (W. Ford. ed. 1908); see
also 24 Journals of the Continental Congress 227-28, 386-87 (1783) (G. Hunt ed. 1922)
(attack on Spanish vessel).
86. 21 Journals of the Continental Congress 1136 (1781) (G. Hunt ed. 1912).
87. Note, supra note 82 at 1017.
88. Id. (quoting 21 Journals of the Continental Congress 1136 (1781) (G. Hunt ed.
1912)) (emphasis added).
89. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813-15 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
90. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 878.
92. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
93. 726 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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vided on the rationale for dismissal. 4 Judge Edwards agreed
with the rationale of Filartiga, but voted to dismiss the action
based on his findings that there was no international consensus
that terrorism or unofficial torture is a violation of the law of
nations. 5 Judge Bork dismissed the action holding that the doc-
trine of separation of powers mandates a demonstration of ex-
press grant of authority to bring a private cause of action prior
to invocation of the Alien Tort Statute. 6 Finally, Judge Robb
practically precluded all judicial review of alien tort claims by
holding that all human rights claims under the Act are non-jus-
ticiable political questions. 7
The most recent case in which the Alien Tort Statute was
invoked was De Blake v. Republic of Argentina.8 A California
district court accepted jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort
Statute in a case in which an argentine businessman claimed
that he had been tortured by argentine government officials."
Argentina originally defaulted, but upon petition for reconsider-
ation, the case was dismissed based on Argentina's sovereign im-
munity defense. 100
The Sanchez-Espinoza court examined the plaintiffs' claims
under the Alien Tort Statute and concluded that the statute was
enacted only to provide relief from private, nongovernmental
acts by United States citizens abroad, such as privacy or assaults
on ambassadors which violate the law of nations or treaties.'
Judge Scalia found that no treaty exists which prohibits ac-
tions like those of the defendants when conducted by private
individuals. 10 2 Moreover, customary international law'03 does not
94. Id.
95. Id. at 775-98 (Edwards, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 798-823 (Bork, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 823-27 (Robb, J., concurring).
98. No. CV82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. September 28, 1984).
99. Id.
100. De Blake v. Argentina, No. CV82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. March 7, 1985)
(vacating default judgment and dismissing the action).
101. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 206. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813-15 (Bork, J.,
concurring). But cf. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775-98 (Edwards, J., concurring).
102. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 206.
103. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Customary international law
is derived from the norms which are established by the eustoms and usages of civilized
nations.
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reach private, nongovernmental conduct. 04 Therefore, there was
no basis for invoking the Alien Tort Statute which applies only
to private acts. The defendants' acts were not private acts which
violated international law, and plaintiffs, therefore, had no valid
claim.'0 5
The court of appeals was willing to assume for purposes of
argument that the Alien Tort Statute covers official state acts as
well as private acts.'0 6 If that had been the case, then the federal
defendants could be sued only in their official capacities. 07
Thus, the plaintiffs would be seeking to alter the future actions
of the United States. 0 8 This result would violate the doctrine of
sovereign immunity and would be inconsistent with the existing
case law. 109
C. Sovereign Immunity
The court of appeals in Sanchez-Espinoza relied on varied
authority to support its holding that United States officials were
insulated from suit in this case by the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. For example, the court cited Eminente v. Johnson,"" in
which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity when it held that a
nonresident alien could not maintain an action against the
United States for damage to property in Vietnam caused by
United States armed forces, without the consent of the United
States."'
Judge Scalia also relied on the Supreme Court's application
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in both Land v. Dollar"
2
and Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp."3 Both
104. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 206-07. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791-96.





110. 361 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 929 (1966).
111. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 207.
112. 330 U.S. 731 (1947) (stockholders in a steamship company brought action to
enjoin the Maritime Commission from selling stock which had been turned over to the
commission pursuant to a subsidy and loan contract).
113. 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (a private corporation sued the Administrator of the War
Assets Administration in his, official capacity, but Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the
Court, held that the suit was against the United States, and, in the absence of consent by
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cases held that sovereign immunity is an important doctrine
which prevents judicial determinations which would interfere
with public administration by restraining the government or
forcing the government to act in a particular way." 4 Suits
against agents of the United States will only be entertained
when the agent is acting illegally and is sued individually. 1 5 For
these reasons, the claims of the Nicaraguan plaintiffs were prop-
erly dismissed."
16
The court recognized that sovereign immunity may be
waived in certain circumstances. 117 Plaintiffs claimed that the
Alien Tort Statute constituted such a waiver, but the circuit
court relied on Canadian Transport Co. v. United States" 8 in
its determination that the Alien Tort Statute is not, in itself, a
waiver of sovereign immunity." 9 In Canadian Transport, Judge
Robb declared that the language of the statute does not indicate
a waiver of sovereign immunity from tort suits or treaty viola-
tions, and that the court should not affix such a meaning to the
statute.120
Judge Scalia did find a waiver of sovereign immunity with
respect to the claims for nonmonetary relief in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act,12 ' which provides in relevant part:
[An action] seeking relief other than money damages and
stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee
thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or
under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor
relief therein denied on the ground that it is against the
United States.'22
The court found, however, that all bases for nonmonetary
relief are discretionary. 2 3 Judge Scalia reasoned that all discre-
the United States, the district court was without jurisdiction). See Sanchez-Espinoza,
770 F.2d at 207.
114. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 207 (citing Land & Larson).
115. Marlone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 647 (1962).
116. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 207.
117. Id.
118. 663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
119. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 207.
120. Id. (citing Canadian Transport, 663 F.2d at 1092).
121. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
122. Id. (quoted in Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 207).
123. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 207-08. The court cited TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S.
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tionary relief should be withheld in Sanchez-Espinoza because
of the sensitivity of the foreign affairs matters which were at
stake. " ' The court permitted to withhold the discretionary relief
under the section of the Administrative Procedure Act which
provides that the judicial review provision does not curtail "the
power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief
on any. . . appropriate legal or equitable ground."' 26 Thus, this
waiver of sovereign immunity carried no practical weight in
Sanchez-Espinoza.
Judge Scalia was careful in distinguishing the doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity from the doctrine of domestic sover-
eign immunity in order to prevent confusion in the future. He
pointed out that an Alien Tort Statute suit filed against an
agent of a foreign government would not necessarily have to be
dismissed. 26 By doing so, he preserved the Second Circuit's de-
cision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.
2 7
D. Constitutional Issues
Plaintiffs' presented claims under the fourth and fifth
amendments to the United States Constitution, which guaran-
tee, respectively, freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures,"2 " and protection against deprivation of rights without
due process of law or adequate compensation.' Although the
issue was presented as to whether plaintiffs (nonresident aliens)
qualified for protection under the United States Constitution,
153 (1978) (injunction is discretionary relief); Whitehouse v. Illinois Central R.R., 349
U.S. 366 (1955) (mandamus is discretionary); Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U.S.
491 (1942) (declaratory judgments are discretionary).
124. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 208.
125. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982)).
126. Id. at 207 n.5.
127. Id.
128. The full text of the fourth amendment is as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
129. The relevant portions of the fifth amendment provide: "No person shall be ...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
[Vol. V
COMMENTS
the circuit court declared that it need not discuss the question
whether constitutional protections extend to noncitizens
abroad., 0 Both Johnson v. Eisentrager,'3 ' and Pauling v. McEl-
roy 132 suggest that nonresident aliens ordinarily could not appeal
to the protection of the Constitution. The court of appeals con-
cluded that no relief would be available to the Sanchez-Espi-
noza plaintiffs in any case. 33
Judge Scalia recognized that in some instances, however,
federal courts may create a damages remedy for violations of
constitutional rights under the Supreme Court's ruling in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics.1 3' The Bivens decision is supplemented, however, by the
Court's later ruling in Chappell v. Wallace,"5 which cautions
"that such a remedy is not available when 'special factors coun-
selling hesitation' are present."'3 6 What constitutes those special
factors was further clarified in Bush v. Lucas. 3 7 "Where, for ex-
ample, the issue "'involves a host of considerations that must be
weighed and appraised,'" its resolution "'is more appropriate
for those who write the laws rather than for those who interpret
them.' "'
Applying the reasoning of Bush to the facts of Sanchez-Es-
pinoza, the court of appeals entertained no doubts that judicial
creation of damage remedies was improper in light of the consid-
erations of institutional competence which were before the
court.'3 9 Judge Scalia declared that "the special needs of foreign
affairs must stay our hand in the creation of damage remedies
against military and foreign policy officials for allegedly uncon-
130. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 208.
131. 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (nonresident enemy alien has no constitutional rights nor
access to American courts during wartime).
132. 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960) (nonresident
aliens cannot appeal to the protections of the Constitution or the laws of the United
States).
133. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 208.
134. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (plaintiff was awarded damages for illegal entry and search
by federal narcotics agents).
135. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
136. Id. at 298 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
137. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
138. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 208 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 370 (quoting
United States v, Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1954))).
139. Id.
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stitutional treatment of foreign subjects causing injury
abroad.'140  The court feared "'embarrassment . . . abroad'
through 'multifarious pronouncements,' 1'41 and elected to leave
to Congress the decision whether a damage remedy should
exist. "
E. Other Issues
In resolving the question whether the appellants were enti-
tled to damage remedies under the War Powers Resolution, the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment and the National Security Act of
1947, the court of appeals focused on whether Congress intended
to create a remedy when enacting those statutes.143 When deal-
ing with statutes, the court may not fashion a remedy that Con-
gress did not intend.1" Private damage actions are inappropriate
with regard to these statutes because Congress did not identify
any class to which benefits are intended. 14  These statutes exist
for the protection of the general public. 1 6 This proposition is
supported by Cannon v. University of Chicago,"7 the language
of the acts themselves, and the legislative history of the
statutes. 148
The last statute considered by the court was the Neutrality
140. Id. at 209.
141. Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981) (no private action may
be implied under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 because
neither congressional intent nor legislative history support a finding that private actions
are allowed or that § 10 was created for the special benefit of a particular class).
145. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 209.
146. Id. (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 (1979)).
147. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). A private party may maintain a lawsuit based on federal
statutes only if the statute expressly authorizes private action or, in the absence of such
authorization, if Congress intended to make a remedy available to a special class of liti-
gants. In determining congressional intent, the four-part test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975) is applied and the court must consider: 1) whether the statute was enacted for
the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a member, 2) whether there is any
indication of legislative intent to create a private remedy, 3) whether implication of such
a remedy is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme, and
4) whether inferring a federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject matter in-
volves an area basically of concern to the states. 422 U.S. at 78.
148. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 209 (citing War Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a)
(1973); National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1947); and S. REP. No. 730, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4182, 4192, 4193).
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Act, a section of the Criminal Code that prohibits preparations
for 'any military or naval expedition or enterprise . . . against
the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state.""' The
Neutrality Act provides penalties in terms of a fine of up to
$3,000 and imprisonment of up to three years. The court of ap-
peals, however, was skeptical about the proposition that a pri-
vate right of action could be derived from a criminal statute.'50
Judge Scalia stated:
It would be doubly difficult to find a private damage ac-
tion within the Neutrality Act, since this would have the
practical effect of eliminating prosecutorial discretion in
an area where the normal desirability of such discretion
is vastly augmented by the broad leeway traditionally ac-
corded to the Executive in matters of foreign affairs."'
The court of appeals did not ignore the claims of the con-
gressional plaintiffs alleging violations of the Boland Amend-
ment and the congressional right to participate in the decision to
declare war. The cause of action relating to the Boland Amend-
ment was dismissed as moot because the Amendment's appro-
priations, and thus its operating effect, had expired at the close
of the fiscal year (September 30, 1983). 15' Dismissal of the con-
stitutional portion of the congressional plaintiffs' allegations was
based on the political question doctrine and Crockett v. Regan,
as it had been in the district court's opinion.' 53
Finally, the circuit court addressed the issue of pendent ju-
risdiction and the state law claims of the Florida residents. Like
the district court, the court of appeals found that the claims had
no independent basis for jurisdiction. Because all other federal
claims were dismissed, the state claims, too, must be dismissed
as per the Supreme Court's holding in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs. 5 '
149. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1960)).
150. Id. at 210.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
154. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 210 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (establishing the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction)).
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CONCLUSION
The decision of both the district court and the court of ap-
peals are prudent and legally well founded. The courts, however,
could have gone further in setting down precedent with regard
to judicial review of international questions. Through dictum,
the courts could have expressly stated that the plaintiffs (partic-
ularly the Nicaraguan residents) presented meaningful claims
which, if proven, would have displayed violations of interna-
tional norms. Furthermore, the courts should have made it clear
that such actions are subject to judicial determination in United
States federal courts.
Other political organizations in the world community have
for over one hundred years recognized the need to achieve high
standards in terms of protection of fundamental human
rights.'55 In the early part of this century, the League of Nations
was designed to protect the "minority rights, labor rights and
the rights of individuals in mandated territories."'I5 The more
recent Charter of the United Nations, which has been called a
"global constitution, '"1 57 guarantees rights of human dignity and
was drafted primarily as a reaction against nazi aggression and
genocide.' Current authoritative decision makers, including
states and international organizations, have followed a trend
which promotes human rights, in their pursuit of economic and
political policies, 59 and hundreds of treaties, agreements and
resolutions have been written and accepted in the international
community.'60
In particular, the right of persons to be free from torture
has received significant attention recently. The Universal Decla-
155. D. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS 4 (1983). The first Geneva
Convention for victims of armed conflict was signed in 1864 and provided for the neutral
treatment of medical personnel so that sick and wounded soldiers receive medical care.
Id.
156. Id. at 5-6.
157. Id. at 7.
158. Id. at 8. See U.N. CHARTER art. 55 (1945).
159. M. McDOUGAL & H. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPEC-
TIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 790 (1981).
160. In 1980, the United Nations General Assembly's third committee on human
rights adopted thirty-five human rights resolutions pertaining to such offenses as disap-
peared persons, mass exoduses, summary executions, fact-finding missions, and com-




ration of Human Rights provides that "[n]o one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. ' 16 1 The Geneva Convention,'16 2 The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,6 8 and the United Na-
tions Declaration on the Protection of Persons From Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment 8 4 all join in the proscription of torture and are supported
by various regional commitments and special international codes
of conduct." 5
In 1972, Amnesty International launched a "major cam-
paign for the abolition of torture" and, in 1973, published its
first "report on torture."' 66 This campaign has created signifi-
cant achievements, including a petition to the United Nations
bearing over one million signatures calling for an anti-torture
resolution, involvement by several intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations in the development of international
161. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/183, at 135 (1948).
162. Protection of War Victims (armed forces in the field) Convention, August 12,
1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3118, T.I.A.S. No. 3364.
163. G.A. Res. 2200, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
164. G.A. Res. 3218, 1 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 82, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
165. See [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms of 4 Nov. 1950, art. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 5 ("No one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); American Convention
on Human Rights, art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 ("No one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons de-
prived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person."); African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, part II, art. 5, June
27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, not yet in force ("All forms of exploitation
and degradation of man, particularly . . . torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punish-
ment or treatment shall be prohibited."); U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners, art. 31 (1957) ("Corporal punishment, punishment by placing in a
dark cell, and all cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments shall be completely prohib-
ited as punishments for disciplinary offenses."); G.A. Res. 33/179, U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 45) at 162, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1979) ("No law enforcement official may inflict, in-
stigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, nor may any law enforcement official invoke superior orders or exceptional
circumstances . . . as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."); G.A. Res. 33/194, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 210, U.N.
Doc. A/37/51 (1983) ("It is a gross contravention of medical ethics, as well as an offense
under applicable international instruments, for health personnel, especially physicians,
to engage, actively or passively, in acts which constitute participation in, complicity in,
incitements to or attempts to commit torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.").
166. TORTURE IN THE 80'S: AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2 (1984).
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standards against torture, increased coverage by the news media
of torture and other human rights abuses, and the development
of the Urgent Action Network (a direct assistance mechanism
which provides cables and express letters from participants
around the world on behalf of potential victims of torture.)"'
Despite the widespread rejection of torture in the interna-
tional community and the increasing efforts to deal with it, tor-
ture continues to thrive as an institutional cog in the "state con-
trolled machinery to suppress dissent"'6 8 in many countries. It
has been justified as an efficient method of fulfilling a state's
obligation "to defeat terrorists and insurgents who have put in-
nocent lives at risk and who endanger both civil society and the
state itself."' 69
It has been alleged and forcefully argued that the United
States has played a significant role in the continued existence of
institutionalized torture. 17 0 The Reagan administration has been
accused of promoting torture and other human rights abuses
through its policies toward, and covert operations in, many third
world nations, particularly, Nicaragua.'
7 '
The United States is, at the same time, a leading force in
the international commitment to eliminate human rights abuses.
It has recognized that abuses are often due to political instabil-
ity abroad which is the result of economic realities in the third
world,'72 and it has proved its commitment to human rights
167. Id. See also id. at 249. Amnesty International, in 1983, adopted a "12-Point
Program for the Prevention of Torture" which includes; 1) official condemnation of tor-
ture; 2) limits on incommunicado detention; 3) no secret detention; 4) safeguards dur-
ing interrogation and custody; 5) independent investigation of reports of torture; 6) no
use of statements extracted under torture; 7) prohibition of torture in law; 8) prosecu-
tion of alleged torturers; 9) training procedures; 10) compensation and rehabilitation;
11) international response; and 12) ratification of international instruments.
168. Id. at 4.
169. Id. at 6.
170. CHOMSKY & HERMAN, THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM
(1979); HERMAN, THE REAL TERROR NETWORK (1982).
171. R. GASTIL, HUMAN RIGHTS, 1987 BRITTANICA BOOK OF THE YEAR 235, 236 (1987).
172. Economic rights rank higher than political and civil liberties in the third world.
The Department of State has assessed that the major obstacles to the achievement of
economic rights (limited natural resources, high population growth rates, unequal distri-
bution of income and land, inefficient management of human and natural resources, in-
sufficient trained manpower, civil strife and armed conflict and, in some countries, cor-




through such mechanisms as the Foreign Assistance Act.173
The American judicial system has demonstrated a limited
willingness to participate in the movement to abolish the use of
torture in the international arena. In Filartiga,174 Judge Kauf-
man, writing for the Second Circuit, stated that "for purposes of
civil liability, the torturer has become . . . hostis humanis
generis, an enemy to all mankind.' 7 5 The Second Circuit fur-
ther held that "official torture is now prohibited by the law of
nations.' 76 The Alien Tort Statute was used to assert jurisdic-
tion, indicating that federal courts are valid forums for resolving
international disputes when torture is alleged.
Not all of the circuits have followed the Second Circuit's
lead in asserting jurisdiction over foreign cases involving torture
and other human rights abuses. In Tel-Oren,177 the District of
Columbia Circuit, in its per curiam decision, dismissed an action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in which survivors and
representatives of deceased victims of an armed attack of a civil-
ian bus alleged multiple tortious acts by members of the Libyan
Arab Republic, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Pales-
tine Information Office, the National Association of Arab Ameri-
cans, and the Palestine Congress of North America.
78
The circuit court, in Sanchez-Espinoza, dismissed an op-
portunity to clarify the law regarding federal jurisdiction over
international claims involving torture and other violations of
fundamental human rights. The court should have issued a
warning to the coordinate branches of the government that vio-
173. "[A] principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote
the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights." Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 502B (1974) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1)), re-
printed in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, supra note 7, at 5.
174. 630 F.2d 876.
175. Id. at 890.
176. Id. at 884.
177. 726 F.2d 774.
178. Id. at 775. The claim against the Palestine Congress of North America was aban-
doned on appeal. Id. at n.1. See also Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal.
1985) (class action against defendant alleging involvement in persecution of Jews in Yu-
goslavia during World War II dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and expi-
ration of applicable statute of limitations). But cf. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985) (legal guardian of a Swedish diplomat
brought suit for damages for the unlawful seizure, in 1945, and possible death of the
diplomat; subject matter jurisdiction found under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act;
default judgment entered for the plaintiff).
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lations of treaties and the law of nations will not be tolerated in
American courts. International law regarding torture is an
emerging area of law which requires authoritative interpretation
and judicial decision to aid in the development of binding inter-
national norms.
Richard T. LiPuma
